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Children in Chains:  
Indiscriminate Shackling of Juveniles 
Kim M. McLaurin  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The two boys appeared to be about thirteen or fourteen years old. 
They were arrested in school during their lunch period for fighting.
1
 
Neither boy had thrown a punch. Instead, they demonstrated their 
intent to fight verbally and by facing off in a revolving circle in the 
cafeteria. This verbal argument and near fight caused a large crowd 
of teenagers to leave their lunch tables to go watch the two boys 
argue. Teachers assigned to keep the lunch period orderly warned the 
growing group of teenagers to return to their seats. These 
admonishments went unheard and unheeded. School police officers 
were called and quickly arrested the two boys.
2
 Both boys were 
transported by school police officers to juvenile court for 
arraignment. Their parents were called and told to meet their children 
in Boston Juvenile Court. As dictated by court security procedures, 
the boys were taken to the court detention facility. This facility 
houses both adults and children, albeit in separate cells and on 
 
  The author is an Associate Clinical Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law 
School. She teaches the Juvenile Defender Clinic and the Marshall Brennan Constitutional 
Literacy Program. The author wishes to thank the following people for their guidance, editing, 
research, and wisdom: Elizabeth Burke (an amazing research assistant), Professor Paul Bennett, 
Dr, Marty Beyer, Professor Frank Rudy Cooper, Assistant Dean Kathleen Engel, Dean Camille 
Nelson, Professor Charles Ogletree, Professor Jeffrey Pokorak, and her parents (for their keen 
sense of justice and fairness). 
 1. To protect the identity of the minors, all identifying information has been omitted. 
 2. Boston, Massachusetts is a city located within Suffolk County. In Suffolk County, 
school police officers are Boston Police Officers assigned to police Boston Public Schools. 
They have arrest powers identical to that of all police officers. See School Police Officers, 
BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, http://www.bostonpublicschools.org/school-police-officers (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2012).  
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opposite ends of the facility—space providing.3 The boys were 
brought into the courtroom from a detention cell located in the 
basement of the courthouse. Each boy‘s mother was already in the 
courtroom when her son was brought up from detention. The 
courtroom was crowded. Defense counsel, prosecutors, probation 
officers, police officers, victim advocates, and a group of law 
students were all in the courtroom. 
Each boy was led into the courtroom with handcuffs and leg cuffs 
around his ankles. A chain connected the handcuffs together, and 
another chain connected the foot cuffs together. The boys were 
directed to stand for their arraignment, and both were assigned 
defense counsel. At no time during this court appearance were the 
restraints removed. The arraignment never occurred. A probation 
officer indicated that neither boy had any prior juvenile court 
involvement, neither boy had ever been arrested before that day, and 
that both boys attended school regularly without incident prior to that 
afternoon. The prosecutor offered a term of pre-trial probation. 
Through their counsel, both boys agreed to this offer. The judge 
inquired as to the nature of the fight and the reason for it. Upon 
hearing that no punches were thrown and that gossip had precipitated 
the near fight, the judge asked the boys to shake hands and put their 
differences to rest. The boys did so still wearing handcuffs on both 
wrists. After they willingly shook hands, the boys were allowed to sit 
down so that the handcuffs and leg cuffs could be removed. They 
were given another court date to return so that the court could 
monitor their compliance with the terms of their pre-adjudicatory 
probation.
4
 
The two boys would not be the last juveniles brought up from 
detention in handcuffs and leg cuffs. Juvenile courts in Massachusetts 
 
 3. Boston Juvenile Court is one of several courts housed in the Edward Brooke 
Courthouse. Boston Municipal Court, which hears adult criminal matters, is also located in the 
Brooke Courthouse. See MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/ 
suffolkjuvenilemain.html and http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/bmcmain 
.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).  
 4. Massachusetts law allows for the postponement of an arraignment for purposes of pre-
adjudicatory probation. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 87 (West Supp. 2011). The 
presiding justice, the Commonwealth, and the juvenile must agree to the terms, duration, and 
final disposition of pre-adjudicatory probation. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  Children in Chains: Indiscriminate Shackling 215 
 
 
had long adhered to a blanket practice of indiscriminate shackling—
restraining every juvenile arrested and transported to court without 
any determination of need for such restraints. This Article argues that 
indiscriminate shackling of juveniles is unconstitutional and should 
therefore be prohibited in the United States. 
In 1967, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided the seminal case 
In re Gault, there was a juvenile or family court in every state in the 
nation, in the District of Columbia, and in Puerto Rico.
5
 As noted in 
Gault, these courts were established to serve the needs of children in 
a setting separate from the criminal justice system that served adults 
and children prior to 1899.
6
 In Gault, the Court noted the history and 
purpose of the juvenile court: ―The child was to be ‗treated‘ and 
‗rehabilitated‘ and the procedures, from apprehension through 
institutionalization, were to be ‗clinical‘ rather than punitive.‖7 To 
date, the juvenile justice system continues to operate and serve 
children under the same mandate of treatment and rehabilitation. 
Despite the ongoing protective and rehabilitative mandate of the 
juvenile justice system, juveniles are still forced to appear in 
restraints during court appearances in juvenile courts across the 
United States. In some jurisdictions, these minors include children as 
young as seven.
8
 Typically, these are adolescents who have been 
arrested, detained, and transported to court. The restraints or shackles 
described in this Article often include handcuffs and leg cuffs, but 
may also include belly belts secured around the waist and a chain that 
connects handcuffed hands to leg cuffs.
9
 In states that allow 
indiscriminate or blanket shackling, every juvenile who has been 
 
 5. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967) (citing NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT 
JUDGES, DIRECTORY AND MANUAL 1 (1964)). 
 6. See id. at 15–16. The first juvenile court was established in Illinois in 1899. See id. at 
14. Prior to 1899, children were processed through the criminal justice system and were often 
incarcerated with adults for similar terms. Id. at 16. 
 7. Id. at 15–16. 
 8. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 52 (West 2008) (defining a ―delinquent 
child‖ as ―a child between seven and seventeen‖ who commits acts of alleged juvenile 
delinquency). 
 9. In some instances this ―belly chain‖ has also connected the individual juvenile to 
another person, or to a piece of furniture, door, or other object inside the courtroom. See 
PATRICIA PURITZ & CATHRYN CRAWFORD, NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, FLORIDA: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 57–58 (2006), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Flordia%20Assessment.pdf. 
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detained at any point prior to or during court proceedings is even 
shackled during court appearances. In some instances, shackling may 
occur prior to charges being filed. In all situations described in this 
Article, indiscriminate shackling occurs regardless of the child‘s age, 
gender, history, charges, ability to obey court rules, or behavior in 
court. Issues such as mental illness, physical challenges or illnesses, 
past sexual or physical abuse, and ongoing effects of trauma are 
ignored.
10
 No individualized determination of need is assessed.
11
  
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet addressed indiscriminate 
shackling of juveniles, but it has done so regarding adults. This 
Article begins by reviewing the Court‘s rulings on blanket shackling 
of adults in Part II. Part III reviews state appellate court decisions that 
have addressed the use of restraints on juveniles in court. Part IV 
makes the argument that indiscriminate shackling of children is 
unconstitutional because it violates the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments (due process of law and right to counsel) to the U.S. 
Constitution.
12
 Part IV also examines the special characteristics of 
adolescents that support this argument.  
Part V of this Article surveys each States‘ current juvenile 
courtroom shackling practices and classifies those practices into four 
categories: (1) States that permit blanket shackling of juveniles; (2) 
States that do not permit blanket shackling via state legislation or 
regulation; (3) States that do not permit blanket shackling via written 
court policy; (4) States where appellate case law has prohibited 
indiscriminate shackling of juveniles; and (5) States that have 
pending legislation which will prohibit indiscriminate shackling. 
 
 10. See, e.g., In re Rebecca C., District Court Division, Guilford County, North Carolina, 
Mot. to Prohibit Shackling of Minor Child in Ct. and Other Public Areas Absent a Judicial 
Finding of Need. The file number has been omitted to protect the identity of Rebecca C. (copy 
on file with author). In this matter, Rebecca, age fourteen, was being treated for bipolar 
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, disruptive behavior disorder, and attention-deficit 
hyperactivity disorder. Rebecca was first sexually abused when she was eight years old and was 
abused for three years. At times, her attacker used handcuffs to restrain her. After her arrest and 
detention, Rebecca was forced to appear in juvenile court in handcuffs. When she appeared in 
2007, North Carolina had a policy of indiscriminate shackling, which did not allow for 
individualized consideration of Rebecca‘s tragic history and diagnoses. 
 11. See id.  
 12. The following recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions are reviewed in Part IV in support 
of this argument: Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2003); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 
(2010); and J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 U.S. 2394 (2011).  
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Florida has enacted legislation and Massachusetts has instituted a 
court policy, both of which address the issue of indiscriminate 
shackling of juveniles in court. Part VI analyzes and compares 
Massachusetts‘ court policy to Florida legislation.  
II. INDISCRIMINATE SHACKLING OF ADULTS 
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the indiscriminate 
shackling of adults both directly
13
 and in dicta.
14
 In Deck v. Missouri, 
the Court addressed the novel issue of whether the use of restraints 
visible to a jury is unconstitutional during the penalty phase as 
opposed to the guilt phase.
15
 In Deck, the Court examined the history 
of the long-held ban on indiscriminate shackling during the guilt 
phase in the presence of a jury.
16
 The Court cited common law 
authority
17
 and state court authority
18
 in recognizing this well-settled 
 
 13. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626 (2005) (―We first consider whether, as a 
general matter, the Constitution permits a State to use visible shackles routinely in the guilt 
phase of a criminal trial. The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible 
shackles during the guilt phase; it permits a State to shackle a criminal defendant only in the 
presence of a special need.‖). 
 14. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (―Trying a defendant for a crime 
while he sits bound and gagged before the judge and jury would to an extent comply with that 
part of the Sixth Amendment‘s purposes that accords the defendant an opportunity to confront 
the witnesses at the trial. But even to contemplate such a technique, much less see it, arouses a 
feeling that no person should be tried while shackled and gagged except as a last resort.‖); 
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568–69 (1986) (―The first issue to be considered here is thus 
whether the conspicuous, or at least noticeable, deployment of security personnel in a 
courtroom during trial is the sort of inherently prejudicial practice that, like shackling, should 
be permitted only where justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial.‖). 
 15. 544 U.S. at 630.  
 16. Id. at 626–29. 
 17. Id. at 626. ―[A] defendant ‗must be brought to the bar without irons, or any manner of 
shackles or bonds; unless there be evident danger of an escape.‘‖ Id. (quoting 4 W. 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 317 (1769)); see also id. (noting 
defendants shall come before the court ―out of irons, and all manner of bonds, so that their pain 
shall not take away any manner of reason, nor them constrain to answer, but at their free will‖) 
(quoting 3 EDWARDO COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 34). 
 18. Id. at 626–27 (citing Parker v. Territory, 52 P. 361, 363 (Ariz. 1898)); People v. 
Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 167 (1871); Eaddy v. People, 174 P. 2d 717, 718 (Colo. 1946) (en 
banc); Hauser v. People, 71 N.E. 416, 421 (Ill. 1904); Blair v. Commonwealth, 188 S.W 390, 
393 (Ky. App. Ct. 1916); State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 592 (1877); State v. McKay, 165 P. 2d 
389, 405–06 (Nev. 1946); State v. Roberts, 206 A.D. 2d 200, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1965); French v. State, 377 P. 2d 501, 502–04 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962); State v. Smith, 8 P. 
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rule against the use of restraints during the guilt stage of court 
proceedings while in front of a jury. 
In dicta, the Court has considered the use of restraints on adults 
during court proceedings before a jury. In Illinois v. Allen, the Court 
opined that ―no person should be tried while shackled and gagged 
except as a last resort.‖19 In 1986, the Court determined that the 
presence of uniformed state troopers sitting in full view of the jury 
during a jury trial was not a violation of the constitutional right to a 
fair trial.
20
 In his decision for the majority, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
wrote, however, that shackling a defendant during court proceedings 
is an inherently prejudicial practice that may violate a defendant‘s 
constitutional right to a fair trial.
21
 
In 2005 in Deck, the defendant was restrained in leg irons, a belly 
belt, and handcuffs as the jury considered the death penalty.
22
 The 
Court reiterated the long-held rule that the right to appear before a 
jury unshackled is a ―basic element of the ‗due process of law‘ 
protected by the Federal Constitution.‖23 The Court identified ―three 
fundamental legal principles‖ which are violated by indiscriminate 
shackling in the presence of a jury:
24
 the presumption of innocence;
25
 
the right to counsel;
26
 and the need of judges ―to maintain a judicial 
process that is a dignified process.‖27 Deck held that indiscriminate 
shackling of adults in the presence of a jury during the penalty phase 
violates the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The Court also held that indiscriminate shackling of 
 
343 (Or. 1883); Poe v. State, 78 Tenn. 673, 674–78 (1882); Rainey v. State, 20 Tex. App. 455, 
472–73 (1886); State v. Williams, 50 P. 580, 581 (Wash. 1897)).  
 19. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344. 
 20. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 571 (1986). 
 21. See id. at 568–69. 
 22. Deck, 544 U.S. at 625. 
 23. Id. at 629.  
 24. Id. at 630–32. 
 25. Id. at 630 (―Visible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence and the 
related fairness of the factfinding process.‖). 
 26. Id. at 631 (―[Shackles] can interfere with a defendant‘s ability to participate in his own 
defense, say, by freely choosing whether to take the witness stand in his own behalf.‖). 
 27. Id. at 631 (―The courtroom‘s formal dignity, which includes the respectful treatment 
of defendants, reflects the importance of the matter at issue, guilt or innocence, and the gravity 
with which Americans consider any deprivation of an individual‘s liberty through criminal 
punishment.‖). 
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the defendant during the penalty phase violated his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.
28
 The Court in Deck held that indiscriminate 
shackling of adults in view of the jury during the penalty phase 
violates each of these rights in the same manner as during the guilt 
phase.
29
 
Because the jury in Deck had already determined the defendant‘s 
guilt, the Court held that the presumption of innocence was not per se 
violated by the use of shackles during the penalty phase, but that the 
issue of life or death was no less critical.
30
 Additionally, the Court 
held that the use of shackles during the penalty phase was a violation 
of the rights to counsel and to due process of law.
31
 Specifically, the 
Court held that shackles interfere with the ability of a defendant to 
assist and communicate with his counsel, and absent any showing of 
need, courtroom restraints abrogate the dignity of court proceedings. 
Notably, the Court further rejected Missouri‘s argument that the 
defendant in Deck had not demonstrated any showing of actual 
prejudice. Instead, the Court reiterated its dicta in Holbrook v. Flynn 
that ―shackling is ‗inherently prejudicial,‘‖32 and therefore no 
showing of actual prejudice is required to demonstrate a due process 
violation.
33
 
Many state courts have rendered similar decisions regarding 
shackling of adults in court. In Deck, the Court noted some of these 
decisions.
34
 Because these cases are not binding upon outside 
jurisdictions, involve only adults, and do not elaborate beyond the 
ruling in Deck, this Article does not focus on those decisions beyond 
noting that it is very well settled law in most states. 
III. INDISCRIMINATE SHACKLING OF JUVENILES 
Many state courts have addressed indiscriminate shackling of 
juveniles. To date, California, Florida, Illinois, North Dakota, 
 
 28. Id at 632. 
 29. Id. at 632–33. 
 30. Id. at 632. 
 31. Id. at 632–33.  
 32. Id. at 635 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986)). 
 33. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626 (2005). 
 34. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
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Oregon, and Washington state appellate courts have ruled on this 
issue.
35
 These cases, while not binding nationally, are illustrative 
because they pertain to juveniles and can be used to strengthen the 
argument that indiscriminate shackling of juveniles is 
unconstitutional. Two state cases set the tone for the argument 
against the blanket use of restraints on minors in court. Each 
addresses common arguments made in support of indiscriminate 
shackling of minors.
36
 
The Supreme Court of Illinois was the first to address blanket 
shackling of juveniles in 1977.
37
 In In re Staley, the minor remained 
handcuffed throughout his bench trial despite oral objections made by 
his attorney.
38
 The trial court cited ―poor security‖ in the courtroom 
as the basis for rejecting the motion to remove the restraints.
39
 On 
appeal, the State argued that the long-held prohibition against 
indiscriminate shackling of adults in the presence of a jury did not 
apply to proceedings involving a juvenile that were heard outside the 
presence of a jury.
40
 The Staley court rejected both arguments. The 
court dismissed the argument regarding a lack of courtroom security 
by indicating that the record did not sufficiently support a finding that 
the minor was a threat to escape or that courtroom security was 
lacking.
41
 Implicit in this ruling is the notion that some individualized 
determination of need must be made before restraints are utilized. 
The Staley court also rejected the second argument put forth by 
the State. The court held that ―[t]he possibility of prejudicing a jury 
. . . is not the only reason why courts should not allow the shackling 
of an accused in the absence of a strong necessity for doing so.‖42 
The court cited the presumption of innocence as being ―central to our 
 
 35. See, e.g., Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007); In re Deshaun M., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); S.Y. v. McMillan, 
563 So.2d 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 1977); In re R.W.S., 
728 N.W.2d 326 (N.D. 2007); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep‘t of Multnomah Cnty. v. Millican, 906 
P.2d 857 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); State v. E.J.Y., 55 P.3d 673 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 36. See Staley, 364 N.E.2d at 72–74; Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 369–73. 
 37. Staley, 364 N.E.2d at 72. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 73.  
 41. Id. at 74. 
 42. Id. at 73. 
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administration of criminal justice,‖43 whether or not the accused was 
an adult or a minor. The court stated that the use of restraints during 
trial infringed upon the right of any defendant to communicate with 
his counsel whether or not a jury was present.
44
 Staley was also the 
first U.S. case to rule that indiscriminate shackling in this instance 
constituted reversible error, and thus was not harmless error. 
Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
45
 expanded 
upon Staley and more fully fleshed out the constitutional argument 
against the use of indiscriminate restraints on juveniles. The blanket 
policy utilized in Los Angeles County is similar to those utilized by 
many states today. Specifically, all detained minors in L.A. County 
were restrained with leg or foot cuffs while appearing in court. This 
policy was rooted in courtroom security.
46
 
On appeal, the County of Los Angeles argued that the policy of 
shackling all detained minors was permissible for several reasons. 
First, where juvenile court proceedings do not involve any witnesses 
and are held before a judge, outside the presence of a jury, and are 
―brief and/or uncontested,‖ no individualized determination of the 
necessity for shackling is required.
47
 Second, Los Angeles County 
argued that, ―safety concerns arising from the design of the 
courthouse facility as well as the lack of sufficient numbers of 
security personnel‖ justify a blanket policy to restrain all detained 
juveniles without a particularized determination of need.
48
 Finally, 
the County argued that all case law limiting the use of courtroom 
restraints involved adults and did not apply to juveniles.
49
 
After reviewing relevant California law and U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions regarding the use of restraints on adults, the court in Tiffany 
A. rejected the arguments made by the County and concluded that the 
indiscriminate use of restraints on juveniles is similarly 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 46. See id. The County of Los Angeles specifically alleged that the juvenile courtroom 
had a number of unsecured doors leading from the courtroom, unsecured hallways, and a lack 
of adequate courtroom security personnel. Id. 
 47. Id. at 365, 367. 
 48. Id. at 365–67. 
 49. Id. 
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unconstitutional and prohibited.
50
 The court held that even where no 
jury or witnesses are present, some showing of need must be 
demonstrated before a juvenile may be restrained in court.
51
 Tiffany 
A. further held that ―the type of proceeding determines the amount of 
‗need‘ that the court must find to justify the use of restraints.‖52 Thus, 
a hearing held in the presence of a jury or witnesses will require more 
of a showing of need for restraints than any hearing when neither jury 
nor witnesses are present.
53
 An individualized determination of the 
need for shackling is therefore required in every instance and a ―court 
must not . . . have a general policy of shackling all defendants.‖54 
Los Angeles County also argued that the use of restraints due to 
lack of adequate security and/or inadequate courtroom facilities was 
sufficient to determine that blanket restraints were necessary.
55
 The 
court rejected this argument, noting that no California court had ever 
―endorsed the use of physical restraints based solely on . . . the lack 
of courtroom security personnel, or the inadequacy of the court 
facilities.‖56 This holds true in other states as well. Each state court 
that has reviewed challenges to blanket shackling policies has held 
that individualized determinations of need must be made, and that 
this determination may not be based solely upon security issues 
within the courtroom.
57
 
Tiffany A. also rejected the argument that case law involving the 
restraint of adults does not apply to similar restraints of juveniles. 
The court held that the underlying rehabilitative purpose of juvenile 
court was contrary to the more punitive use of shackles in court.
58
 
The court noted that the use of shackles without any individual 
determination of need introduces ―the very tone of criminality 
 
 50. Id. at 370–73. 
 51. Id. at 373. 
 52. Id. at 372. 
 53. Id. at 371 (―If the proceeding is before a jury, ‗manifest necessity‘ is clearly required. 
However, where the proceedings do not require a jury a ‗lesser showing‘ of need is apparently 
sufficient.‖). 
 54. Id. (quoting In re Deshaun M., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)). 
 55. Id. at 365. 
 56. Id. at 372. 
 57. See Deck w. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005). 
 58. See Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 375. 
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juvenile proceedings were intended to avoid.‖59 The Tiffany A. court 
also held that ―all juvenile proceedings must contain essentials of due 
process and fair treatment,‖60 and that ―the constitutional presumption 
of innocence, the right to present and participate in the defense, the 
interest in maintaining human dignity and the respect for the entire 
judicial system, are among these essentials whether the accused is 41 
or 14.‖61 
IV. INDISCRIMINATE SHACKLING OF JUVENILES IS AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
The constitutional argument against policies that indiscriminately 
shackle juveniles begins with In re Gault.
62
 In Gault, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that as ―[d]ue process of law is the primary and 
indispensable foundation of individual freedom,‖ its protections must 
be extended to minors appearing in juvenile courts.
63
 Gault began by 
taking note of the many differences between minors involved in the 
juvenile court system and adults in the criminal court system.
64
 
Despite these differences, the Court famously held that ―[u]nder our 
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo 
court,‖65 and that the ―failure to observe the fundamental 
requirements of due process‖ in any court was likely to result in 
―unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of 
fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy.‖66  
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects 
individuals from state encroachment upon any right protected by the 
Bill of Rights if said right is of ―fundamental nature.‖67 Although 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. Although the court in Tiffany A. does not cite In re Gault, the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Gault held that the protections of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution apply with equal force to juveniles. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
1, 27–29 (1967). 
 61. Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 375. 
 62. 387 U.S. at 20. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 14–17. 
 65. Id. at 28. 
 66. Id. at 19–20. 
 67. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963). 
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most juveniles are not tried before a jury, the Court‘s rulings in Deck, 
and other cases dealing with shackling in the presence of a jury, are 
equally applicable to juveniles, regardless of whether these matters 
are heard before a judge alone or before a jury.  
 As the Deck Court identified, indiscriminate shackling violates 
three such fundamental rights.
68
 First, blanket shackling policies 
completely abrogate the presumption of innocence regardless of 
whether the person restrained is an adult or a child. The Court in 
Estelle v. Williams, held that ―[t]he right to a fair trial is a 
fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.‖69 ―The 
presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the 
Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of 
criminal justice.‖70 Gault specifically conferred protection of the Bill 
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment upon juveniles while 
appearing in juvenile court if the right in question is of a fundamental 
nature. It stands to reason therefore, that juveniles are entitled to a 
fair trial and to the hallmark of a fair trial—the presumption of 
innocence, both of which are fundamental rights. 
Even when a jury is not present, indiscriminate shackling violates 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. A shackled, teenaged 
defendant is more likely than an adult to respond to his/her state of 
restraint and to disengage from effective communication with his/her 
attorney. Deck noted that courtroom restraints might interfere with an 
adult defendant‘s right to counsel. The Court reasoned that a shackled 
adult may have difficulty communicating with his attorney and may 
not be able to fully participate in the defense, thereby implicating the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
71
 Deck also noted that shackling 
may ―confuse and embarrass‖ adult defendants, thereby affecting 
their ability to participate in their defense and diminishing their Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.
72
 This effect is only heightened when 
the shackled defendant is an adolescent.
73
 
 
 68. Deck, 544 U.S. 622, 630–32 (2005). 
 69. 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975)). 
 70. Id.  
 71. Deck, 544 U.S. at 631. 
 72. Id. (quoting People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168 (1871)). 
 73. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the effects of indiscriminate shackling upon 
adolescents.  
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The third fundamental legal principle identified in Deck is the 
duty of the judge to maintain the dignity of the court process.
74
 The 
Court explained this requirement as ensuring that all defendants 
receive a fair trial and that the court process is conducted with 
―formal dignity, which includes the respectful treatment of 
defendants, reflects the importance of the matter at issue, . . . and the 
gravity with which Americans consider any deprivation of an 
individual‘s liberty.‖75  
Juvenile courts must be conducted in a similar manner, as the 
liberty interests of juvenile defendants are similar. Gault compared 
the loss of liberty of adults in criminal court to that of juveniles in 
juvenile court. The Court noted that this loss was virtually identical, 
if not more severe; therefore, juveniles are entitled to the same 
constitutional protections as adults.
76
 In every state, juveniles face a 
potential loss of liberty as a result of delinquency adjudication. The 
gravity of these proceedings is similar to that of adult criminal 
proceedings. Therefore, as the Court held in Gault, constitutional 
protections of fundamental rights afforded to adults within the 
criminal justice system must be extended to juveniles appearing 
within the juvenile justice system. 
Policies that allow for the restraint of all detained juveniles in 
court are contrary to the goals and objectives of juvenile court.
77
 In 
Kent v. United States,
78
 the U.S. Supreme Court noted that juvenile 
court proceedings were civil in nature and that its objectives were ―to 
provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and 
protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and 
punishment.‖79 Shackling juveniles without any individualized 
determination of need is contrary to the notions of rehabilitation and 
guidance described in Kent.
80
 As noted in Tiffany A., indiscriminate 
 
 74. Deck, 544 U.S. at 631–32. 
 75. Id. at 631. 
 76. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27–30 (1967). 
 77. See Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 375–76 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
 78. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 79. Id. at 554. 
 80. See Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 375–76. 
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shackling ―creates the very tone of criminality juvenile proceedings 
were intended to avoid.‖81 
Finally, indiscriminate shackling of juveniles is contrary to 
Supreme Court decisions regarding juveniles. The Court has a 
lengthy history of recognizing the inherent differences in adolescents 
and adults. It has long held that in some situations the developmental 
and sociological capabilities of juveniles requires disparate treatment 
than that accorded to adults in similar situations. In Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, the Court poignantly recognized that ―youth is more than 
a chronological fact.‖82 In Johnson v. Texas, the Court held that age 
must be considered as a mitigating factor against the death penalty.
83
 
In Haley v. Ohio, the Court ruled that age was a factor in determining 
the voluntariness of a confession.
84
 The Haley Court noted ―[t]hat 
which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and 
overwhelm a lad in his early teens.‖85 That the law is not being 
equally applied to children is not a new observation.
86
 Each State 
imposes age-based limits on when children may drive, drink alcohol, 
vote, marry, work, and drop out of school.
87
 All these decisions and 
laws implicitly and explicitly recognize that children and adolescents 
are not developmentally on par with adults. Given these 
developmental differences, children and adolescents require disparate 
treatment. 
The Court has continued and, some believe expanded the 
demarcation between adults and minors in three recent cases. Roper 
v. Simmons,
88
 Graham v. Florida,
89
 and J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
90
 
uphold the notion that children are not ―miniature adults,‖ and 
therefore require unique protections.
91
 
 
 81. Id. at 375. 
 82. 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). 
 83. 509 U.S. 350 (1993). 
 84. 332 U.S. 596, 599–601 (1948). 
 85. Id. at 599. 
 86. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (addressing custody for 
Miranda purposes); Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (addressing parental consent 
requirement for abortion). 
 87. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403–04 n.6 (2011). 
 88. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 89. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 90. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
 91. Id. at 2404. 
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Roper and Graham held that the inherent differences between 
children and adults required that children be categorically excused 
from certain sentences.
92
 In J.D.B., the Court held that age is a 
significant factor when deciding the objective question of custody in 
the context of confessions.
93
 
A. Special Characteristics of Adolescents 
In Roper, Graham, and J.D.B., the Court relied upon scientific 
and sociological studies regarding adolescent development. 
Specifically, the Graham Court concurred with petitioner‘s amici that 
―developments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds‖ that last 
through late adolescence, and that recent data does not ―provide 
reason to reconsider the Court‘s observations in Roper about the 
nature of juveniles.‖94 
These differences are also the principles upon which juvenile 
court was created. In Kent and Gault, the Court described the 
underlying theory of juvenile court as being parens patriae due to the 
fundamental differences between adults and children.
95
 ―The 
objectives [of juvenile courts] are to provide measures of guidance 
and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix 
criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment.‖96 Explicit in the 
establishment of the juvenile justice system as a system distinct from 
the criminal justice system is the notion that the needs of adolescents 
 
 92. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding sentence of death for a crime committed while 
below eighteen years of age is a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (holding sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole for a crime that is not a homicide offense is a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment if imposed upon a person under eighteen 
years old).  
 93. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2406. 
 94. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 95. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–17 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554–55 
(1966).The Latin phrase parens patriae means ―parent of the country.‖ The Court in Gault 
described its application to juvenile justice as a situation where ―parents default effectively in 
performing their custodial functions—that is, the child is ‗delinquent‘—the state may 
intervene.‖ Gault, 378 U.S. at 16 
 96. Kent, 383 U.S. at 554. 
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and children cannot be met by the criminal justice system that serves 
adults. 
The Court‘s ruling in Deck takes on new significance when the 
defendant subjected to indiscriminate shackling is an adolescent. 
Several psychological, medical, and social work experts have noted 
the significant social, biological, and developmental differences 
between adults and adolescents. When an adolescent is shackled with 
no individualized finding of need, three fundamental rights; the 
presumption of innocence, the right to counsel, and maintenance of a 
dignified judicial process; are much more likely to be impugned due 
to the inherent developmental, sociological, and biological 
differences between adolescents and adults. 
First, shackling without reason abrogates the presumption of 
innocence that ―lies at the foundation of the administration of our 
criminal law.‖97 Indiscriminate shackling has a more potent effect 
when the accused is an adolescent who is not likely to have a secure 
sense of identity and is more likely to be susceptible to external 
perceptions.
98
 The Court in Roper recognized this influence: 
―juveniles are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside 
pressures.‖99 ―Being shackled in public is humiliating for young 
people, whose sense of identity is vulnerable. The young person who 
feels he/she is being treated like a dangerous animal will think less of 
him/herself.‖100 Where an adult may be able to conclude that shackles 
do not define their identity, an adolescent is not able to draw the same 
conclusion.
101
 
Additionally, it has been widely noted that juveniles also have a 
more intensive sense of morality than most adults.
102
 When they feel 
that they have been treated unfairly or have been unjustly wronged, 
 
 97. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630 (2005) (citing Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 
432, 453 (1895)). 
 98. See Aff. of Dr. Marty Beyer 3–4, available at http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthe 
children/AppendixDBeyer.pdf. 
 99. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 100. Aff. of Dr. Marty Beyer, supra note 85. 
 101. Id. at 5 (―Knowing they are capable of remaining calm in the courtroom without 
handcuffs or shackles, young people conclude it must be something bad about them that 
justifies the chains.‖). 
 102. See id. 
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they tend to focus on this unfairness and perceived wrongdoing.
103
 
An adolescent who has been shackled without reason may find it very 
difficult to participate in the entire court process.
104
 This may affect 
communication with his/her attorney and willingness to testify and/or 
participate in his/her defense, all of which negatively impact the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. An adolescent with a still 
developing identity may be more likely to respond negatively to, and 
be harmed by, the blanket use of shackles.
105
 Deck noted that the 
indiscriminate use of restraints in court ―suggests to the jury that the 
justice system itself sees a ―‗need to separate a defendant from the 
community at large.‘‖106 An adolescent who has been shackled 
without reason is likely to feel removed from the juvenile justice 
system that was created to serve him/her. 
Second, Deck noted that shackles ―‗ten[d] to confuse and 
embarrass‘ defendants‘ ‗mental faculties,‘ and thereby tend 
‗materially to abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional 
rights,‘‖ including his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.107 If the 
defendant is an adolescent, experts agree that blanket shackling will 
―prejudicially affect‖ that juvenile defendant‘s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.
108
 Even without the distraction of shackling, 
adolescents have difficulty with ―judgment, decision-making, and 
ability to develop the trust, confidence and open communication 
necessary for an effective attorney-client relationship.‖109 A shackled 
 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. (―For most young people who believe that, even though they were arrested, 
they will not harm others and will not misbehave in the courtroom, it seems unfair to be 
shackled. Adolescents do not have the adult cognitive abilities to say, ‗This is not unfairness 
directed at me personally, all juveniles who go into court are shackled.‘ Because of where they 
are developmentally, their reaction to the unfairness of being shackled may preoccupy them, 
interfering with their paying attention to what the judge says in the courtroom.‖). 
 105. See id. (―Children and adolescents are more vulnerable to lasting harm from feeling 
humiliation and shame than adults. In the midst of their identity and moral development, 
demeaning treatment by adults may solidify adolescents‘ alienation, send mixed messages 
about the purpose of the justice system, and confirm their belief that they are bad.‖). 
 106. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630 (2005) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 
560, 569 (1986)). 
 107. Id. at 631 (quoting People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168 (1871)).  
 108. Cf. Aff. of Dr. Marty Beyer, supra note 98, at 5 (finding that shackling of minors 
diverts attention from courtroom proceedings). 
 109. See Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., Charles Hamilton 
Houston Institute for Race & Justice, and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as 
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adolescent is clearly much less able to navigate the attorney client 
relationship than the shackled adult described by the Court in 
Deck.
110
 
Third, Deck also held that blanket shackling undermines the 
maintenance of dignity within the judicial process. The language of 
the Court in describing this requirement mirrors the Gault Court‘s 
description of due process of the law. Deck stated that all defendants 
must receive a fair trial, and that the court process must be conducted 
with ―formal dignity, which includes the respectful treatment of 
defendants, reflects the importance of the matter at issue, . . . and the 
gravity with which Americans consider any deprivation of an 
individual‘s liberty.‖111 Similarly, in Gault, the Court stated that 
―[d]ue process of law is the primary and indispensible foundation of 
individual freedom.‖112 Gault went on to famously note that since the 
juvenile defendant faced a ―restrain[t] of liberty for years‖ he was 
entitled to full constitutional protections, and that ―the condition of 
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.‖113 
As juvenile courts in the United States have increasingly served 
children of color, the effect of indiscriminate shackling on 
adolescents of African-American and Latino descent in particular 
must be addressed. Disproportionate minority representation 
continues to plague juvenile courts throughout the United States. 
Black youth are consistently overrepresented in juvenile courts, 
particularly as compared to their white counterparts.
114
  
 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 
08-7412 & 08-7261) (citing Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 
5 ANN. REV. CLIN. PSYCH. 459, 468–71 (2009); Patricia Puritz & Katayoon Majd, Ensuring 
Authentic Youth Participation in Delinquency Cases: Creating a Paradigm for Specialized 
Juvenile Defense Practice, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 466, 474 (2007)). 
 110. Deck, 544 U.S. at 631. 
 111. Id. 
 112. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967). 
 113. Id. at 27–28. 
 114. In 2008, black youth between ages thirteen and fifteen accounted for approximately 
16.7 percent of the overall juvenile population in the United States. White youth (in the same 
age range) made up approximately 77.3 percent of the juvenile population. See CHARLES 
PUZZANCHERA, ANTHONY SLADKY & WEI KANG, EASY ACCESS TO JUVENILE POPULATION 
STATISTICS: 1990–2010 (2011), OJJDP.GOV, available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/eza 
pop/asp/profile_display.asp These percentages do not hold up in juvenile courts. In 2008, the 
percentage of black youth who had cases handled by juvenile courts in the United States more 
than doubled that of the black juvenile population within the United States. Thirty-six percent 
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Common mechanisms of restraint are handcuffs and foot cuffs.
115
 
As previously noted, some jurisdictions also utilize belly belts and 
chains that connect these devices to other restrained juveniles and to 
furniture and other objects within the courtroom.
116
 These restraints 
are of the same type used to restrain slaves and have significant 
negative connotations for black children. Many psychological experts 
widely believe that ―the critical psychosocial task of adolescence‖ is 
―the search for and development of one‘s identity.‖117 This process 
can be much more treacherous for adolescents of color who do not 
belong to more highly valued, majority groups. ―Individuals who 
belong to highly valued groups do not need to modify or enhance 
their social identity; however, when faced with a context that 
devalues one‘s group, the person may have to engage in a process to 
negotiate the meaning of his or her identity.‖118 When any adolescent 
is indiscriminately shackled and forced to appear in court before 
friends, family, court personnel, and the public, feelings of confusion, 
humiliation, vulnerability, and embarrassment are likely to negatively 
affect that individual‘s search for an identity. If that adolescent is of 
color, then this process of defining one‘s identity includes 
development of an ethnic identity. When the court system restrains 
adolescents of color without reason in a manner similar to restraints 
used on slaves, and when this is done in full view of family, friends, 
court personnel, and the public, their ethnic and social identities will 
be impacted.  
 
of all juveniles who had cases handled in juvenile court were black juveniles between the ages 
of thirteen and fifteen. In contrast, the percentage of white juveniles aged thirteen to fifteen who 
had case handled by juvenile courts in the United States decreased relative to the overall 
population percentages. Sixty percent of juveniles, aged thirteen to fifteen who had their cases 
handled in juvenile court in 2008 were white. See CHARLES PUZZANCHERA & WEI KANG, EASY 
ACCESS TO JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 1985–2008 (2011), OJJDP.GOV, available at 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs/asp/demo.asp.  
 115. Foot cuffs are also known as leg irons. 
 116. See PURITZ & CRAWFORD, supra note 9.  
 117. Sabine French et al., The Development of Ethnic Identity During Adolescence, 42 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2006). 
 118. Id. at 1–2. 
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V. CURRENT STATE SURVEY ON INDISCRIMINATE SHACKLING 
Despite the many constitutional and ethical arguments against the 
blanket use of shackles on juveniles without any showing of need, 
most states continue to do so a daily basis.
119
 A handful of states have 
prohibited this practice via legislation,
120
 written court procedures or 
policy,
121
 or appellate case law.
122
 In addition, three states have 
pending legislation that calls for an individualized determination of 
need.
123
 In this section, this Article will review and compare two 
efforts to prohibit indiscriminate shackling: the recently enacted court 
policy in Massachusetts and Florida legislation. 
The Massachusetts policy became effective in juvenile courts on 
March 1, 2010.
124
 The stated purpose of this policy is to ―provide 
procedures and guidelines and promote uniformity in practice when 
using restraints on juveniles‖ when minors appear in court.125 The 
policy not only covers all juveniles under seventeen years of age in 
delinquency and children in need of services (CHINS) matters,
126
 but 
 
 119. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont (but see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5123 
(2009), which prohibits indiscriminate shackling of juveniles during transport to court), 
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Washington, D.C. are all believed to allow 
indiscriminate shackling of juveniles. Practices may differ widely within various courthouses 
within the same state. For the purposes of this Article, a state is classified as allowing 
indiscriminate shackling of juveniles if no judicial decision, written procedural rule, written 
court policy, or legislation specifically prohibits the practice in court. 
 120. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.100(b) (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2402.1 (2010); N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 168.3(a) (2011); 237 PA. CODE § 139 (2011). 
 121. See TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OFFICER POLICY & PROCEDURES 
MANUAL ch. 4, § 6 (2010); In re Use of Physical Restraints on Respondent Children, No. CS-
2007-01, (N.M. Sept. 19, 2007), available at http://nmsupremecourt.nmcourts.gov/rules/pdfs/ 
comments/Comments%20on%20Proposed520Amendments%20toForm%2010-427.pdf. 
 122. See, e.g., Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007); In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 1977); In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326 (N.D. 
2007); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep‘t of Multnomah Cnty. v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857 (Or. Ct. App. 
1995); State v. E.J.Y., 55 P.3d 673 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 123. Alaska, Connecticut, and South Carolina have pending legislation that calls for a ban 
on indiscriminate shackling of minors in court. 
 124. See TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OFFICER POLICY & PROCEDURES 
MANUAL, supra note 121. 
 125. Id.  
 126. A child in need of services (―CHINS‖) is defined by MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, 
§ 21 (West 2008). This type of civil matter is included in the statutory code in many states.  
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also those under eighteen years of age in care and protection 
matters
127
 and those under twenty-one years of age in youthful 
offender matters.
128
 
The Massachusetts policy has a ―presumption against use of 
restraints‖ during all court appearances unless the presiding justice 
determines that restraints are necessary.
129
 Such an order must be 
based upon specific findings and must be entered on the record. The 
judge must find that restraints are necessary because the minor ―may 
try to escape, or that a juvenile may pose a threat to his or her own 
safety, or to the safety of other people in the courtroom, or restraints 
are reasonably necessary to maintain order in the courtroom.‖130 The 
policy lists nine factors that the judge must consider when making 
this determination. A finding that just one of these factors exists may 
result in the use of restraints during court appearances. The nine 
enumerated factors are: 
(a) the seriousness of the present charge (supporting a concern 
that the juvenile had an incentive to attempt to escape); (b) the 
criminal history of the juvenile; (c) any past disruptive 
courtroom behavior by the juvenile; (d) any past behavior that 
the juvenile presented a threat to his or her own safety, or the 
safety of other people; (e) any present behavior that the 
juvenile represents a current threat to his or her own safety, or 
the safety of other people in the courtroom; (f) any past 
escapes, or attempted escapes; (g) risk of flight from the 
courtroom; (h) any threats of harm to others, or threats to cause 
a disturbance, [sic] and (i) the security situation in the 
 
 127. Care and protection matters in Massachusetts are also known as child protective 
matters in other jurisdictions. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 21, ch. 209A, § 1 (West 
2008) (containing definitions of these petitions). 
 128. See TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OFFICER POLICY & PROCEDURES 
MANUAL, supra note 121 (defining juvenile for purposes of policy application). A youthful 
offender is a juvenile subject to penalties of the criminal and/or juvenile justice systems due to 
age and crime charged. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (West 2008). 
 129. See TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OFFICER POLICY & PROCEDURES 
MANUAL, supra note 121. 
 130. Id.  
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courtroom and courthouse, including risk of gang violence, or 
attempted revenge by others.
131
  
The presiding judge may receive information from court officers, 
probation officers, or any other source that they deem credible. 
Finally, the policy mandates that no court ―shall impose a blanket 
policy to maintain restraints on all juveniles, or a specific category of 
juveniles, who appear before the court,‖ and may ―not cede 
responsibility for determining the use of restraints‖ to the court 
officer.
132
 
A few states have enacted legislation or regulations specifically 
prohibiting indiscriminate shackling of minors in court. Florida Rule 
8.100
133
 is fairly representative of these legislative efforts. Rule 8.100 
applies to all court hearings and prohibits the use of any type of 
restraint on a child in court unless the court finds that restraints are 
necessary due to one of three enumerated factors: (1) risk of 
―physical harm to the child or another person‖; (2) a ―history of 
disruptive courtroom behavior‖ by the child that created ―potentially 
harmful situations or presents a substantial risk of inflicting physical 
harm‖ on the child or others; or (3) ―a founded belief that the child 
presents a substantial risk of flight from the courtroom.‖134 The 
presiding judge must further find that a less restrictive alternative, 
which is likely to prevent escape or physical harm to anyone in the 
courtroom, does not exist.
135
 Rule 8.100 recognizes that ―the presence 
of court personnel, law enforcement officers, or bailiffs‖ may be 
potentially less restrictive alternatives to the use of any type of 
restraint.
136
 
The Massachusetts policy and Florida‘s Rule 8.100 require that an 
individualized determination of need be found before a juvenile may 
be shackled in court. Thus, they share some commonalities: both 
prohibit indiscriminate shackling, both allow for the use of restraints 
in certain limited and identified situations, and both mandate that the 
 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.100 (2011). 
 134. Id. § 8.100(b).  
 135. Id. § 8.100(b)(2). 
 136. Id. 
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presiding judge make a record if restraints are to be utilized. In 
addition, both cite the prevention of physical harm to the minor and 
to any other person in the courtroom as a potential basis for allowing 
the use of restraints.
137
 And neither allows a judge or court to enforce 
a blanket policy of shackling juveniles. Finally, both mandate that the 
sole decision regarding whether to shackle or not rests with the 
presiding judge.
138
 The similarities end there. 
The Massachusetts policy contains elements that are not supported 
by decisional law. The policy allows for the use of restraints based 
upon the juvenile‘s criminal history and the seriousness of the crime 
charged. Several cases indicate that neither of these factors should be 
considered. In Deck, the defendant was convicted of two counts of 
murder and was facing the death penalty.
139
 Despite the seriousness 
of the crimes and the severity of the penalty faced, neither was a 
determinative factor considered by the Supreme Court.
140
 Even where 
prior criminal acts include serious allegations of escape, courts have 
held that the presiding judge must make a determination regarding 
whether a less restrictive alternative to shackles is available.
141
  
The ruling by the Ninth Circuit in Spain v. Rushen
142
 made clear 
that the seriousness of the crime charged and a defendant‘s criminal 
history should not be considered when determining the need for 
restraints during court proceedings. Instead, Spain mandated that all 
other less restrictive alternatives be explored before shackling is 
utilized.
143
 Johnny Spain, the named defendant in Spain, was charged 
with participating in a violent uprising and escape attempt from San 
Quentin Prison in 1971.
144
 Spain was charged with five counts of 
murder in the first degree, conspiracy, and assault. During an 
attempted escape from the courthouse by Spain‘s accomplice, three 
 
 137. FLA. R. JUV. P. § 8.100 (2011); see supra note 120. The Florida Rule and the 
Massachusetts policy both seem to mirror the holdings in Deck and in Tiffany A. in this regard. 
 138. See supra note 120. 
 139. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624–25 (2005). 
 140. See id. at 630–32. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 720 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Illinois v. Allen, 397 
U.S. 337 (1970)). 
 143. Id at 728. 
 144. Id. at 713–14.  
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people, including the presiding judge, were killed.
145
 Spain was 
repeatedly disruptive during court proceedings and was removed 
several times to a holding cell where he continued to be disruptive. 
Despite his history of escape attempts and violence, the Ninth Circuit 
held that ―[d]ue process requires that shackles be imposed only as a 
last resort.‖146  
The Massachusetts policy also contains determinative factors that 
may have little or nothing to do with the individual defendant‘s 
conduct. The presiding judge in Massachusetts may consider ―the 
security situation in the courtroom and courthouse, including risk of 
gang violence, or attempted revenge by others‖ as the sole 
determinative factor.‖147 This is contrary to the ruling in Tiffany A. 
There, the California Appellate Court noted that California courts that 
had ―considered the use of physical restraints in the courtroom, 
irrespective of the type of proceeding, [had] looked to the conduct of 
the individual defendant to determine the need for restraints,‖ and 
that no California court had ever ―endorsed the use of physical 
restraints based solely on the defendants‘ status in custody, the lack 
of courtroom security personnel, or the inadequacy of the court 
facilities.‖148 
In contrast, one federal court has ruled that courtroom security 
issues may be the sole determinative factor for a blanket policy of 
restraining adults during preliminary hearings before a judge. In 
United States v. Howard, the Ninth Circuit held that courtroom 
security issues could properly be the sole determinative factor 
regarding the use of shackles.
149
 The court in Tiffany A. distinguished 
the facts in Howard from those involving most shackled juveniles.
150
 
First, the Howard court indicated that an individualized assessment of 
the need for restraints for each defendant prior to their arraignments 
 
 145. Id. at 719.  
 146. Id. at 728. 
 147. TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OFFICER POLICY & PROCEDURES 
MANUAL, supra note 121. 
 148. Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007). 
 149. 463 F.3d 999, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 2006). The court ruled that courtroom security was 
an adequate reason to allow a blanket policy of courtroom restraints on defendants appearing 
for arraignment. Id.  
 150. Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 373–75. 
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may not have been possible.
151
 This is not the case in most juvenile 
arraignments, and no evidence to the contrary was demonstrated in 
Tiffany A.
152
 In Howard, the court only allowed restraints to be used 
during the first appearance.
153
 In Tiffany A., the policy extended to all 
appearances for all detained juveniles.
154
 In Howard, multiple 
defendants routinely appeared before the judge for an initial 
appearance. The facts of Tiffany A. involved only one defendant, and 
the court in Tiffany A. declined to determine if the arraignment of 
multiple juvenile defendants could necessitate a diminished showing 
of need.
155
 The court in Tiffany A. made a final, important distinction 
from the facts in Howard. Tiffany A. involved a juvenile in juvenile 
court and not an adult in criminal court. The very purpose of juvenile 
court, rehabilitation, is undermined by the criminal implications that 
indiscriminate shackling implies. 
In contrast to the Massachusetts policy, the legislative effort in 
Florida
156
 hews much more closely to available case law. It does not 
allow for consideration of factors such as gang activity, past criminal 
behavior, seriousness of the crimes charged, or courtroom security 
issues.
157
 Rule 8.100 does allow for consideration of a defendant‘s 
history of disruptive courtroom behavior when determining the need 
for restraints in court.
158
 Rule 8.100 states that this behavior must 
constitute behavior that ―has placed others in potentially harmful 
situations.‖159 On its face, consideration of this factor seems contrary 
to the ruling in Spain. However, as Spain noted, the use of restraints 
is not a per se constitutional violation.
160
 The trial court in Spain did 
not consider any less restrictive alternative to shackles and therefore 
 
 151. See id. at 374. 
 152. See id. at 369. Many juvenile courts have school reports, probation reports, 
information regarding prior juvenile arrests, and reports from police and courtroom security 
available prior to arraignment. This plethora of information comports to the stated rehabilitative 
purpose of juvenile court. 
 153. See id. at 374. 
 154. See id. (―Here, however, this matter concerns the use of restraints at nearly every 
appearance in the Lancaster juvenile delinquency court.‖). 
 155. Id. 
 156. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.100(b) (2011). 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. § 8.100(b)(1)(B).  
 159. Id. 
 160. Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1989). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 38:213 
 
 
erred.
161
 In contrast, Rule 8.100 requires that the presiding judge 
specifically find that no less restrictive alternative to shackling 
exists.
162
 
A ―substantial risk of flight from the courtroom‖ is another 
determinative factor under Rule 8.100.
163
 The presiding justice must 
have a ―founded belief‖ that such a risk exists.164 In contrast, the 
Massachusetts policy permits the presiding judge to order restraints if 
she finds that the juvenile ―may try to escape‖ and no level of proof 
or belief is indicated.
165
 Thus, Florida seems to appropriately balance 
the need of the state to maintain custody with the juvenile‘s right to 
due process of the law and to counsel.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Indiscriminate shackling of adults and juveniles without an 
individualized determination of need violates the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that appearing in court in ―shackles 
‗impos[es] physical burdens, pains, and restraints . . ., . . . ten[ds] to 
confuse and embarrass‘ [adult] defendants‘ ‗mental faculties‘ and 
thereby tend ‗materially to abridge and prejudicially affect [their] 
constitutional rights.‘‖166 Where the defendant is not an adult, but 
instead is an adolescent, these constitutional rights are much more 
likely to be negatively impacted. The inherent developmental and 
sociological differences between adults and adolescents have been 
widely recognized by psychologists and by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The Court has long recognized these differences, and recently in 
Roper, Graham, and J.D.B., the Court has carved out categorical 
exceptions for adolescents and has held that age must be considered 
when determining the subjective question of custody. The practice of 
 
 161. See id. at 728. 
 162. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.100(b)(2) (2011) (listing increased courtroom security personnel as 
an example of a less restrictive alternative to shackling). 
 163. Id. § 8.100(b)(1)(C).  
 164. Id.  
 165. TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OFFICER POLICY & PROCEDURES 
MANUAL, supra note 121. 
 166. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 631 (2005) (quoting People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 
165, 168 (1871)). 
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indiscriminate shackling is unconstitutional as applied to adults and is 
even more so when applied to children. 
Despite this, thirty-six states and the District of Columbia still 
allow indiscriminate shackling. Only eleven states have banned 
indiscriminate shackling of juveniles via legislation, regulation, 
appellate case law, or court policy. Three states have pending 
legislation that would prohibit this practice. Juveniles subjected to 
indiscriminate shackling often encounter this practice pre-
adjudication. No determination of guilt or wrongdoing has been 
assessed, and in some situations, no juvenile delinquency petition has 
been filed.  
Where indiscriminate shackling is allowed, the ability to control 
oneself in court is irrelevant and dismissed. Indiscriminate shackling 
sends the clear message that the juvenile justice system views 
adolescents as criminals, as people from whom society must be 
protected, as people not to be trusted to behave in court, and as 
individuals presumed guilty at the very first appearance.  
This message and practice is not only harmful, but also 
unconstitutional. 
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